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INTRODUCTORY 
Humanitarian law, as a distinct body of law aiming at the protection of 
the individual in times of war, finds written expression in the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 1 and the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II to the 
Geneva Conventions. 2 But only a small number of the provisions in these 
instruments directly apply to civil war situations. In recent years, however, 
particularly since the end of the Cold War, wars have become, almost 
exclusively, internal affairs, fuelled by ethnic, religious, ideological, and 
economic tensions. The draft of common Article 3 pertaining to non-
international conflicts, as submitted by the ICRC at the Diplomatic 
Conference of 1949, which finalised the form of the Geneva Conventions, 
arouse more controversy and debate than any other provision. Many 
1. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 
31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, 
and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, U.S.T. 3217, 
75 U,N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 
75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
2. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for 
signature Dec. 12, 1977 1125 U.N.T.S. (Protocol I); Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec 12, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609 (Protocol II). 
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governments, who were currently embroiled in colonial conflicts and wars of 
self determination, (or likely to be in the foreseeable future) were simply not 
prepared to allow the restraint on their sovereignty and actions which the draft 
demanded. Newly independent governments, such as Burma, were also 
reticent, perceiving the article as a threat on their recently gained sovereignty. 
The resultant common Article 3 is considerably different from that which was 
originally proposed. The outcome was very much a compromise, in which an 
effort was made to reduce the most fundamental principles of the Geneva 
Conventions into a single provision. During the 1960s and 1970s the ICRC 
began to consider ways in which some of the defects of the common Article 3 
could be improved. Armed conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, developments in 
technology and the growth of phenomena such as terrorism and guerilla 
warfare raised concerns about the relevance and application of common Article 
3 to these new situations, and led to the Diplomatic Conference on 
Humanitarian Law held in Geneva from 1974-1977.The problem was that 
while many developing countries were keen to extend international law as 
widely as possible to anti-colonial struggles or wars of self determination, 
they were less inclined to do so for indigenous revolutionary movements. 
Consequently, the Conference saw the eventual development of two Protocols: 
Protocol I, which internationalised wars against colonial or racist oppression 
and Protocol II concerned with other internal conflicts. Both Protocols were 
primarily concerned with the protection of civilians. Protocol II which was 
considered at the end of the Conference almost failed to be adopted as by then 
many countries had lost interest. It was subjected to similar concerns that 
faced common Article 3 at the time of its adoption, regarding its perceived 
threat to sovereignty and being potentially encouraging of rebellion and 
separatist movements. Time constraints resulted in many of the detailed 
provisions in the draft, which were closely modelled on Protocol I, being 
radically reduced in order to ensure adoptation by as many countries as 
possible. 
This paper examines the adequacy of existing humanitarian law as it 
relates to internal armed conflicts and considers a number of recent 
developments instigated by the international community relating to the 
enforcement of humanitarian law. 
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COMMON ARTICLE 3 
a. General 
Common Article 3 became the first provision in any international 
convention to specifically address the issue of internal conflicts. In many ways 
it was a revolutionary development because it demanded that a state treat its 
nationals according to universally defined standards. It is also the only 
provision of the four Geneva Conventions which refers exclusively to internal 
armed conflicts. While the article offers victims some level of protection, this 
is certainly considerably less than that prescribed by the four Conventions 
pertaining to international armed conflicts. However, it is important to 
emphasise that the article represents a minimum code only. Many people have 
regarded the Article as a Convention in Miniature or a mini Convention 
because it embraces the fundamental principles of the laws of war. Pictet in his 
C o m m e n t a r y 3 considers it as one of the most important articles in the 
Conventions. 
Common Article 3 is now generally considered to have attained the 
status of customary law. In the Nicaragua case the International Court of 
Justice considered that common Article 3 contained the core norms of 
humanitarian protection which were applicable to both non-international and 
international conflicts. The Court stated that: 
Article 3 ... defines certain rules to be applied in the armed conflicts of a 
non-international character. There is no doubt that, in the event of international 
armed conflicts, these rules also constitute a minimum yardstick, in addition to the 
more elaborate rules which are also to apply to international conflicts; and they 
are rules which in the Court's opinion reflect what the Court in 1949 called 
"elementary considerations of humanity"4 
3. PlCTET, J: Commentary Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva: 
ICRC, 1952) at 38. 
4. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ REP. 14, 114, paras 218-219. 
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In this case the Court determined that the conflict between the Contra 
rebels and the Sandanista Government was internal and as such, governed 
only by common Article 3, while that between the United States and the 
Government was international. 
b. Scope and Application 
The first issue with the Article raises is the precise definition and 
meaning of the phrase "armed conflict not of an international character." 
During the Diplomatic Conference considerable debate focused on the question 
of whether the term should be more precisely defined. Pictet refers to a number 
of criteria which were outlined at the Conference as useful in distinguishing 
between situations of armed conflicts and those that fall below the required 
threshold to which Article 3 will apply. 5 These are closely reflective of the 
criteria that traditionally governed recognition of belligerents. Indeed many 
delegates at the Diplomatic Conference believed that the Article applied only 
to those situations which would have previously warranted belligerent 
recognition. 6 Pictet insists, however, that common Article 3 is not confined 
only to the above situations and should instead be applied as widely as 
possible. 7 A conflict does not need to reach the level required for recognition 
of belligerency for common Article 3 to apply -Article 3 applies also to low 
intensity conflicts. The concept of armed conflict comprises relatively 
objective and commonly accepted elements. Authoritative ICRC commentary 
has stated that: 
Conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed conflicts, with armed forces on 
either side engaged in hostilities - conflicts in short, which in many respects 
are similar to an international war but take place within the confines of a 
single country. 8 
5. PICTET, supra note 3 at 49 . 
6. See BOND, J.: The Rules of Riot (Princeton University Press, 1974), 5 3 . 
7. PICTET, supra note 3 at 50. 
8. ELDER, D.: "The Historical Background of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Convention of 1949", (1979) 11 Case W Res J Intn'l L 3 7 at 53 . 
296 
APPLYING HUMANITARIAN LAW TO NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 
297 
Common Article 3 was first applied in Guatemala in 1954. 9 Since then 
it has been explicitly accepted and applied in a number of situations including 
Lebanon (1958), Cuba (1959), Vietnam (1964), and Chile (1973) . 1 0 In 
various other situations it has not been acknowledged, but the ICRC has been 
able to visit detainees such as in Algeria (1955), Kenya (1956), Burundi 
(1972) and Ethiopia (1974). 
c. Obligations of the Parties 
An important attribute of common Article 3 is that it imposes 
obligations on all the parties to a conflict and not just on the government. As 
Lysaght 1 1 notes, the juridical basis for imposing legal obligations on persons 
or bodies other than the government, is questionable. Concern on this point 
was also expressed at the Conference. Certainly, it had previously been 
thought impossible in international law to bind non-parties to an International 
Convention, particularly given that such parties may not have even been in 
existence at the time of the signing. However, it can be argued, that a 
government ratifies a convention on behalf of its nationals, including those 
who revolt against it. 
In theory, common Article 3 should be applied automatically and 
without discretion. The obligations imposed by the provisions are absolute 
and there is no reciprocity clause. An authority in question can only free itself 
from the obligations of the convention by following common Articles 
63/62/142/158 which pertain to denunciation. It should be noted, that only a 
High Contracting Party or internationally recognised government may 
denounce the Convention and that denunciation does not take effect 
immediately. In any case, as common Article 3 is recognised as customary 
law and in addition ius cogens 1 2 derogation from it would not be permitted. 
9. VEUTHEY, M.: "Implementation and Enforcement of Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights in Non-International Armed Conflicts: The Role of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross" (1983) 33 Am U L R 83, at 87. 
10. FORSYTHE, D,: "Legal Management of Internal War: The 1977 Protocol on 
Non-International Armed Conflicts" (1978) 72 Am J Int'l L 272, 275. 
11. LYSAGHT, C : "The Scope of Protocol II and its Relation to Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Other Human Rights 
Instruments" (1983) 33 Am UL R 9, 12. 
12. SCHINDLER, D.: "The Different Types of Armed Conflict" (1979-11) 163 
Recueil des Cours 117, 151. 
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The rigorous demands as to the standard of protection, requires a considerable 
degree of organisation and discipline by the parties concerned. However, a 
party may not accept or reject only such parts of the provision of which they 
are capable. Theoretically and in practice the entire Article must be applied 
and implemented. 
The final paragraph states that the legal status of the parties is not altered 
by application of the Article. This clause was considered indispensable to 
suppress fears, particularly by the de jure governments concerned, as to the 
effects that endorsement would have on the legal status of the parties. The 
clause implies that the Convention is humanitarian in nature and that it is not 
concerned with the internal political affairs of a state. The application of 
common Article 3, therefore, does not constitute recognition by the de jure 
government in any way of the rebel party. Further, it will not restrict a 
government's right to restrain or quell any rebellion through whatever means 
its own domestic laws allow. It will also not affect the rebel party's legal 
status in international terms by giving them any special recognition, privilege 
or protection other than that set out in the Convention. 
d. Humanitarian Content 
The humanitarian content reflects the principles in each of the four 
Conventions. Sub-paragraph 1 contains the essence of the fundamental 
principle underlying the Conventions in general, namely that of humanity 
towards others and is thus of major importance. It embodies principles from a 
number of sources including the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV on Law of 
War on Land, and the four Geneva Conventions. It also embraces certain 
principles of human rights regarding non-discrimination. 
The provision extends to all civilians not engaged in hostilities, 
including members of the armed forces who as individuals or members of a 
group have laid down their arms. The important qualifying provision is that 
former combatants are not taking part in hostilities. All such persons are 
entitled to humane treatment, "without any adverse distinction founded on 
race, colour, religion or faith, sex or any other similar criteria." No doubt this 
provision reflected the recent memories of acts perpetrated against minority 
groups on the basis of racial, ethnic and religious differences during World 
War II. In order that no potential loopholes remained, the final phrase as to 
"other similar criteria" was adopted. 
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1 3 . PICTET, supra note 3 at 54. 
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What constitutes "humane treatment" is defined in the negative in that 
the Article then proceeds to outline four major prohibitions. Provision 1 (a-c) 
deals with acts which are generally considered repugnant by public opinion 
namely: 
a) Violence to life and Person; 
b) Taking of hostages; and 
c) Outrages upon personal dignity particularly humiliating and degrading 
treatment. 
The final provision 1 (d) refers to the prohibition on summary justice. 
As Pictet observes, 1 3 this provision was not intended to protect persons from 
arrest by the legitimate bodies of the state and does not prevent the state from 
duly arresting, prosecuting and punishing persons according to the process of 
the law. Although the provision does not detail what minimal judicial 
guarantees must be provided for other than those "recognised as indispensable 
by civilised peoples" reference can be made by analogy to Protocol I, Article 
75 which sets out certain fundamental judicial guarantees. These include 
informing the accused of charges, an impartial court, conducting the trial in 
the presence of the accused and access to a process of defence. Sub-paragraph 
1(2) refers to the care of the wounded and sick. There is no further elaboration 
as to what the word "care" involves and this is certainly less than the more 
detailed requirements of Article 12, Geneva Convention I which deals 
comprehensively and indetail with this issue. 
e. Implementation 
The only reference to implementation is in paragraph 2 which refers to 
the right of humanitarian initiative and enables any humanitarian organisation 
such as the ICRC to "offer its services". Such services are not confined only to 
humanitarian services and can include help in negotiating and implementing 
the provisions of the Article. There is no duty on a government to accept such 
an offer but they must examine it in good faith. In practice, the ICRC will 
approach an internal conflict by calling on all sides to observe humanitarian 
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law through careful and discreet negotiation, any contracts will then be made 
public in a summarised form. 
Paragraph 3 urges the parties to apply the other provisions of the full 
Geneva Conventions to the conflict as well. Legally, the parties are only 
bound by the minimum requirements of common Article 3. While not 
phrased as an obligation the parties should certainly "endeavour" to negotiate 
extra agreements whenever possible. Special agreements have in fact been 
negotiated in a number of situations particularly at the initiation of the ICRC. 
This happened, for example, in Yemen 1 4 and in Niger ia 1 5 where both sides 
agreed to apply the full Geneva Conventions. More recently in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the parties to the conflict agreed to include special provisions 
regarding captured combatants, the conduct of hostilities and assistance to 
civilians. 1 6 
f. Enforcement 
The procedures for enforcing common Article 3 are not specified within 
the article itself. Lysaght 1 7 notes that there are two possible interpretations or 
schools of thought as to enforcement of the Article which depend on the view 
that is taken of the Article's relationship to the rest of the Geneva 
Conventions. The first is to consider the article as an isolated provision. This 
view is reinforced by reference to common Article 2 which is generally 
accepted as defining the extent of coverage of the Conventions as excluding 
non-international conflicts. The other view is to consider common Articles 
49/50/129/146 which refer to each High Contracting Party taking measures for 
"the suppression of all acts contrary to the present Convention". It is 
tempting, therefore, to consider the "all acts" as also including breaches of 
14. BOALS, K.: "The Internal War in Yemen" in Falk (ed), The International 
Law of Civil War (1971) 314. 
15. FARER: "Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts: Towards the Definition 
of International Armed Conflict" (1971) 71 Col L R 37, 60. 
16. Agreement Between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
May 22, 1992. 
17. LYSAGHT, supra note 11 at 12. 
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Protocol I 
Protocol I addresses a variety of issues that were considered defective and 
inadequate in earlier humanitarian law and the laws of war. In addition to 
bringing wars of national liberation into the ambit of international conflicts, it 
also establishes a set of rules defining military objectives, and provides 
guidelines for the conduct of combat operations. The Protocol is also 
important in imposing obligations for greater protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects (Articles 50-56), extending fundamental 
guarantees (Article 75) and measures for protecting women and children 
(Articles 76-79) amongst other innovative provisions. A number of its 
provisions are declaratory of customary law and are therefore binding in any 
international armed conflict. 
It is useful to briefly mention Protocol I because although legally it 
internationalises a specific group of conflicts, it is submitted that in reality 
these are internal conflicts taking place within a single border. Protocol I, 
18. LÓPEZ, L.: "Uncivil Wars: The Challenge of Applying International 
Humanitarian Law to Internal Armed Conflicts" (1994) 69 N Y UL R 916 at 938. 
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common Article 3 which would considerably broaden the scope of possible 
enforcement mechanisms. 
There is no reference to the concept of grave breaches in the Article. 
However, the general definition of grave breaches does include wilful killing, 
torture and inhumane treatment which are all prohibited by common Article 
3. The problem is that there are no provisions specified as to penal sanctions. 
As Lopez has noted: 
Thus the provisions mandating criminal accountability for grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions do not automatically apply during civil 
wars . 1 8 
Nevertheless, recent rulings by the Tribunal for War Crimes in the 
Former Yugoslavia suggest that the absence of enforcement mechanisms in 
common Article 3 may no longer be a bar to bringing violators of the Article 
to justice. 
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Article 1 (4) extends the application of common Article 2 of the Conventions 
to include all armed conflicts: 
in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien 
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination. 1 9 
The concept of wars of liberation as envisaged by the Article is limited 
to the above classes and does not include wars of secession or revolts against 
oppressive regimes. Further, self-determination under the United Nations 
Charter refers only to non-self governing territories, trust territories and 
mandated territories and does not apply within an established and sovereign 
state. The Protocol will, therefore, apply to only a very limited number of 
situations so far as it is concerned with internal type conflicts. 
Originally the provision was aimed primarily at Israel, South Africa and 
Portugal. The latter relinquished control of its former territories shortly after 
the Protocol was adopted. With the emergence of a democratic South Africa 
and recent developments in Israel, there are few remaining candidates, such as 
for example Timor, who would qualify under the above definition. Had the 
framers exercised greater vision, the Protocol could have been worked to 
include wars of national liberation by minority groups who are being 
systematically persecuted and oppressed. Certainly, this would have 
encompassed a number of internal conflicts being conducted today. Potential 
problems of definition could have been overcome by demanding similar pre-
conditions as those set out in Protocol II regarding the requirement of 
territorial control, organisation and a capacity to adhere to the Protocol. In 
addition, it would have been possible to state the objective characteristics of 
governmental regimes which, because of the systematic abuse of human rights 
of minority groups, for example, would validate a claim for self-determination. 
19. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for 
signature Dec. 12, 1977 1125 U.N.T.S. 
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Protocol II 
a. Introduction 
The legislative history of Protocol I I 2 0 revealed similar problems of 
concerns with sovereignty as had occurred during the drafting of common 
Article 3 . 2 1 In many respects it is difficult not to conclude, given the above 
discussion on Protocol I, that during its drafting a selective humanitarianism 
operated. While many countries were keen to denounce racist and colonial 
regimes they were less inclined to support limitations on conduct in internal 
conflicts which were perceived as an interference in a state's sovereign rights. 
Because of the radically opposing views by participants at the Diplomatic 
Conference and the difficulty of obtaining agreement, the result was what the 
Vatican called, "a gentlemen's embarrassment" 2 2 as opposed to a gentlemen's 
agreement. 
Protocol II has been relatively uncontroversial but that may well be 
because it has so rarely been resorted to due to its limited field of 
applicability. The only conflict in which Protocol II has been considered 
applicable has been in El Salvador 2 3 which is a party to the Protocol. 
However, in that situation the government refused to apply its provisions to 
the civil war in progress at the t ime . 2 4 Other conflicts which would have met 
the threshold required have been Lebanon, Ethiopia, Chad and Nicaragua but 
in general the state concerned was not a party to the Protocol and hence it was 
not considered. 
Protocol II supplements and expands upon common Article 3 and can 
not be applied alone independently of common Article 3. Along a continuum 
it would appear that Protocol II would take over from Article 3 remembering 
that the latter still continues to apply, once hostilities reach a certain level. 
20. See Forsythe, supra note 10, for an outline of the history of Protocol II. 
21. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 
opened for signature Dec 12, 1977. 1125 UNTS 609. 
22. Ibid, at 282. 
23. FLECK: The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995) para 127. 
24. WHEELER, M.: "Humanitarian Law, El Salvador and Protocol II: Do These 
Equal Substantive International Law?" (1980) 21 Case W Res J Int'l L 203, 213. 
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Although Protocol II will, therefore, operate simultaneously with common 
Article 3, the latter is autonomous in that it is not constrained by the 
operation of the Protocol. Both common Article 3 and Protocol II have a 
number of other features in common including: non-recognition of the revel 
party as a legal entity in international law; no special status accorded to 
combatants; and non-application to internal disturbances. 
b. Application 
Article 1 (1) of Protocol II states that it applies to all armed conflicts not 
covered by Protocol I and which: 
take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed 
forces and other organised armed groups which, under responsible command, 
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. 
Protocol II will only apply where the insurgent or rebel group are 
organised and control some part of the territory. While it is not specified what 
proportion of territory must be controlled the emphasis is on the quality of 
that organisation and control. It must be sufficient to enable the opposition 
forces to apply the provisions of the Protocol. These conditions, in many 
respects, resemble the requirements of a full-scale civil war as already outlined 
under the customary law of belligerency. Further, unlike common Article 3 it 
does not apply to situations such as that which prevailed in Lebanon in the 
1980s and Somalia in 1992 which involved conflicts between different rebel 
groups contesting for power as government and where the government itself 
had dissolved. Protocol II only applies between a government and a rebel 
group. 
c. Obligations of the Parties 
Theoretically, the Protocol should apply automatically once the required 
threshold has been reached. However, the concept that rebel forces be able to 
implement the Protocol suggests the element of reciprocity. This is in 
contrast to common Article 3 and in fact to the underlying scheme of the 
Conventions as a whole in which the obligations do not depend on whether 
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25. G.A.Res.2200A, 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N.Doc. 
A/6316(1966) 999 UNTS. 
26. Save the Children Fund (UK), "Emergency Update Rwanda" 20 Novem-
ber 1995, 2. 
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the other side observes the provisions,or not. Article 3 of Protocol II reaffirms 
the qualification in common Article 3 that its provisions do not confer any 
legal status on the parties to the conflict. The Article goes further and notes 
that the Protocol may not be used to justify any intervention in the internal or 
external affairs of the High Contracting Party. 
d. Humanitarian Content 
Protocol II expands and elaborates considerably upon the basic and 
minimal content of common Article 3. It introduces protective measures that 
have no equal in common Article 3 and which are also not present in human 
rights conventions generally, such as those pertaining to the protection of 
children. It also repeats, almost in their entirety, the fundamental non-
derogable rights of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
R igh t s . 2 5 In addition to a fundamental guarantee of humane treatment, the 
Protocol also deals with different categories of persons namely detainees, the 
wounded, sick and ship wrecked and civilians. 
Article 4 of the Protocol emphasises the fundamental guarantees of 
humane treatment. The Protocol's protective ambit applies to all persons who 
have discontinued or never taken a direct part in hostilities. Activities such as 
violence to life, terrorism rape, pillage and slavery are specifically forbidden. 
Children are given special notice and measures for reunification, removal to 
safe areas and the continuance of their education are included. A particularly 
unfortunate characteristic of many of today's internal conflicts is the increasing 
extent to which children often suffer disproportionately either as casualties, 
through separation from their families, or by becoming recruited as "child 
soldiers." These features were all prevalent in the Rwanda crisis of 1994, for 
example. 
In the Rwanda crisis approximately 100,000 children became separated 
from their parents, 2 6 and children had often been deliberately targeted as part 
of the process of ethnic cleansing. In addition to that, children were 
deliberately recruited to carry out some of the killing. Article 4 expressly 
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addresses this latter concern by prohibiting the recruitment of children under 
the age of 15 into the armed forces. 
Article 5 is concerned with those individuals whose liberty has been 
deprived or restricted as a result of the hostilities. The various provisions 
pertain to the minimum requirements of providing food and water, separate 
cells for male and female, medical services and receiving relief, amongst 
others. Article 6 deals with the some of the precautions necessary in the 
prosecution and punishment of those accused of criminal offences related to the 
conflict and includes a number of fundamental requirements for fair justice. 
Articles 7-12 refer to conditions of care for the wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked. Of particular importance is the protection of medical personnel 
so they are able to carry out their professional duties; they can not be 
penalised, for example, for doing so and medical units and transport must be 
respected at all times. 
An important advancement over common Article 3 is the more extensive 
Forms of protection provided for the civilian population. These are outlined 
in Articles 13-18 and are similar to those of Protocol I, Articles 49-58 relating 
to international conflicts. The section on civilians contains a number of 
provisions which limit the types of admissible military action. Both civilians 
and works and installations capable of unleashing dangerous forces may not be 
the object of deliberate attacks. The use of deliberate starvation as a means of 
legitimate warfare is also prohibited.Civilians may also not be forcibly 
displaced which is particularly relevant in light of the practice of "ethnic 
cleansing". 
Article 18 provides that where the civilian population is suffering undue 
hardship, humanitarian relief aid may be offered by organisations such as the 
Red Cross and be undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting 
Party. This is somewhat ambiguous because there is a mix of mandatory and 
consensual specifications.The only reasonable interpretation is that while the 
state concerned will be under an obligation to accept the relief offered, it may 
regulate the details involved with regard to the necessities of security and the 
military situation. 
e. Implementation and Enforcement 
Protocol II contains very limited reference to implementation and 
enforcement. Many of the original draft articles pertaining to implementation 
and enforcement were deleted in the final form. Even relatively mild proposed 
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provisions, such as the ability of an impartial body like ICRC to cooperate in 
the observance of the Protocol, were finally rejected. 2 7 In fact, there is no 
reference in the Protocol to the ICRC at all, not even in an implementing 
capacity. However, it should be noted that the ICRC is entitled to offer 
humanitarian assistance to any party in an internal conflict under its own 
Sta tute . 2 8 In any case, as common Article 3 continues to apply, the right of 
the ICRC to offer its services will continue. The only reference to 
implementation and enforcement mechanism is Article 19 which stipulates 
that the Protocol is to be disseminated as widely as possible. Consequently, 
although the content of Protocol II is considerably more expansive than that of 
common Article 3 its enforcement provisions are not correspondingly more 
extensive or helpful. A state which is party to Protocol II may denounce it 
and this step will become effective six months following receipt by the 
depository. If the state is actually involved in internal conflict which 
continues beyond six months, the Protocol will continue to remain in force 
along with its corresponding protection. 
Evaluation of Current Legal Instruments 
a. Introduction 
The evaluation of instruments of humanitarian law poses a number of 
difficulties. Certainly, it is possible to analyse the instruments themselves in 
terms of their wording and deficiencies of content and structure. But 
ultimately, the question will be whether they have been successful in meeting 
their broader objectives. Within the chaos that characterises war, success or 
failure becomes notoriously difficult to measure. All wars, particularly civil 
ones, are characterised by violence, torture and abuses of legal and 
humanitarian norms. In most wars, specific examples of violations will defy 
comprehension as to the level of gross excess and savagery that human 
27. Int'l. Comm. of the Red Cross, Draft Protocol Additional to Geneva 
Conventions of August 12, 1949 Relating to Non-international Armed Conflicts, 
art.8(5) (1973), reprinted in 1 Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 
Official Records 35-36. 
28. Article 5, Statutes of the Movement. 
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behaviour can descend to during conflict. Consequently, humanitarian law 
suffers from the same problems and accusations of international law generally. 
That is, there is a tendency to examine what has not been achieved rather 
what has. Yet, as the work of the ICRC testifies, there will be many examples 
where humanitarian law has been consciously observed and applied. Whether 
this is because of the existence of written laws or from motives such as self 
interest, reciprocity or a fundamental and universal moral code beyond which 
the protagonists in a war do not venture is difficult to assess. Nonetheless, a 
number of problems can be identified in the current legal instruments which 
govern internal conflicts. These are set out below. 
b. Definition and Scope of Internal Conflict 
Many commentators have criticised both common Article 3 and Protocol 
II for failing to adequately define the term "non-international conflict". With 
more than one instrument relevant to internal conflicts, it is important to 
establish the minimum threshold criteria within a definition to determine 
applicable legal norms. The problem is that while common Article 3's 
definition is too broad, Protocol II is so specific that appears to be 
unattainable. Continually changing phases of warfare poses a further problem 
in internal conflicts. Generally, there will be a progression of intensity in 
hostilities but these may also recede temporarily. The result in practical terms 
is that a party may refuse to apply the relevant instrument on the basis that a 
conflict of the required intensity no longer exists. 
Protocol IPs high threshold covers only large scale internal 
disturbances. This could effectively allow states to argue that any level of 
violence being witnessed in their countries has not yet reached the high 
threshold required by Protocol II. As the Protocol does not objectively specify 
the actual degree of control required by quantifying the control of area in 
percentage terms either geographically or by population, it is difficult to 
identify exactly whether a situation fits the paradigm. In addition, because 
there is no neutral institution to make any such determination, it is left to 
individual states to evaluate this themselves based on their own self-
interests. 2 9 The other difficulty of importing such a high threshold is that it is 
unlikely that an incumbent government will readily admit that rebel forces are 
sufficiently organised or control the substantial portion of territory that 
29. López, supra note 18 at 927. 
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Protocol II requires. Such an admission would be a public acknowledgment 
that the government has lost support of its nationals and is under serious 
threat. Indeed, it is precisely during periods of tension that governments are 
most likely to vigorously deny the existence of widespread opposition and to 
make concerted efforts to reaffirm their control either through propaganda or 
other means. 
The threshold required for common Article 3 is lower as it does not 
demand the same level of territorial control and organisation by the adverse 
party as Protocol II. The problem with common Article 3 then becomes that 
states simply refuse to acknowledge that an armed conflict exists. There have 
been many instances of states which have refused to apply common Article 3 
despite the clear existence of an armed conflict, such as France in the Algerian 
war of independence and Pakistan in the secession of Bangladesh. These 
difficulties of application are in stark contrast to international conflicts, where, 
as was said earlier, the Geneva Conventions will apply automatically, whether 
or not both sides recognise the existence of the armed conflict. 
Finally, in terms of scope of application, criticism of both provisions is 
that neither is applicable to situations of internal tension such as riots or 
sporadic acts of violence. This criticism, while partly valid, would merely 
lead to further complications if acted on. Although ideally it would be 
comforting to think that the principles of humanitarian law would cover such 
situations, problems of definition would be further compounded if application 
was extended beyond the commonly accepted concept of an internal armed 
conflict discussed earlier. It should also be noted that, in practice, the ICRC 
does intervene in internal disturbances that have not yet denigrated into actual 
conflict on the basis of its own statute and custom accepted by states. 
c. Implementation 
Despite difficulties of definition, the major problem lies in the realm of 
implementation and observance. First, the lack of mechanisms within 
common Article 3 and Protocol II referring to implementation has already 
been mentioned. There is, for example, no system of Protecting Powers. 
Although the ICRC may offer its services to encourage implementation this is 
consensual and governments which are reluctant to allow outside 
organisations into their territory during conflict may refuse such an offer. The 
lack of an outside neutral party may make monitoring of observance and 
compliance difficult. Even where parties have agreed to implementation, there 
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is often a contradiction between agreement and practice. While parties may 
agree to the general applicability of an instrument, they may disagree as to the 
interpretation of its contents and the practicality of abiding by its provisions. 
Often what is agreed between leaders of the parties concerned is not observed 
by combatants further down the ranks. The history of internal conflicts (and of 
war in general) is replete with examples of breaches and atrocities despite 
written confirmation of proposed adherence to humanitarian law between the 
part ies. 3 0 As occurred in the former Yugoslavia, agreement to observe special 
agreements does not necessarily mean that parties will abide by them. 
The character of many internal conflicts today also makes 
implementation problematic. War is no longer the exclusive domain of well 
organised and disciplined armies. The Geneva Conventions were devised 
during a period when there was a clear distinction between different types of 
groups such as civilians and combatants. But today, the fragmentary nature of 
rebel groups, the lack of distinction between civilians and soldiers, the lack of 
an organised and central command make it difficult to ensure dissemination 
and compliance with humanitarian law, even where leaders are agreeable. In 
addition, many government armies today are often badly trained, lack 
discipline and are either poorly paid or often not paid at all. Often they 
themselves tend to form rebel groups, such as in Sierra Leone where some 
army factions organised themselves into lose independent groups and 
terrorised civilians to extort money and supplies. 
Protocol II also sets fairly high standards which may be difficult for the 
parties to meet, even if the desire to do so is there. This is particularly the 
case with regard to the requirements of the penal prosecutions under article 6, 
which demands a relatively sophisticated court procedure and notions of 
justice. Other provisions are worded more relative to prevailing conditions. 
Article 5 ( 1 ) (b), for example, concerned with detainees, specifies that they 
receive only the same level of food and water as is provided to the local 
population. It is important that the provisions are within the attainment 
capabilities of both parties to avoid the possibility of one side, usually the 
government, denying its obligations on the basis that the other side are 
incapable of compliance. 
30. See for example an account of the war in Yemen where the parties agreed 
to respect the principles of the Geneva Conventions but widespread violations 
still occurred; and see Falk D (ed), The International Law of Civil War, (1971) at 
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d. Enforcement 
Undoubtedly, the major area of criticism which has been directed at both 
common Article 3 and Protocol II is in their lack of enforcement mechanisms. 
Protocol II does not even oblige the parties to observe the provisions it 
contains. As discussed earlier, neither make explicit reference to the concept of 
grave breaches which provides for universal jurisdiction over certain offences. 
Consequently, even if governments wished to prosecute alleged violators of 
humanitarian law during internal conflicts, who had since fled the country, 
they would be dependent upon the extradition provisions in treaties other than 
the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I. In general, most extradition treaties 
contain a political exception clause and states may refuse to extradite on this 
basis. In Rwanda, for example, many persons who have been identified as 
perpetrators of the genocide in 1994 still find refuge in other countries. Until 
recently, perpetrators of horrendous atrocities and genocide in internal 
conflicts, such as Pol Pot in Cambodia and Idi Amin in Nigeria, had escaped 
justice. However, the increasing emphasis on bringing war criminals to 
account via International Tribunals, Truth Commissions (South Africa) or the 
domestic court system (Ethiopia) indicates that there is a renewed emphasis 
on the process of enforcement. Governments who grant amnesties to those 
who have perpetrated gross atrocities during recent periods of conflict are now 
being exposed to more open criticism for attempting to sweep aside issues of 
responsibility. 3 1 
Following internal conflicts, the process of bringing violators to account 
is particularly important. Unlike the conclusion of international wars, which 
generally sees opposing combatants crossing back into distant territories, 
former adversaries in internal conflicts often have no choice but to continue 
living together in the same community, often in the same village, once the 
war is over. The process of reconciliation in the aftermath of any war must 
involve a search for justice and the exposure and recording of what occurred. 
This is important both at an individual level, particularly for victims who 
have been tortured or have lost family members and for the country's future 
psychological health. To attempt to deny what has occurred will merely 
perpetuate renewed cycles of violence and reprisals. With regard to the 
31. See for example the criticism of the Angolan Government to grant 
amnesties to ex-Unita generals, responsible for killing tens of thousands of 
Angolans during the recent twenty year civil war there, reported in The Guardian 
28 June 1996, Section 2, 16. 
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Rwanda crisis of 1994, for example, it was clear that both the repatriation of 
thousands of Hutu refugees in countries around the borders of Rwanda and the 
future rebuilding and stability of the country could not really occur until the 
principal perpetrators of the genocide were brought before the courts. The 
other main value of enforcement lies in its deterrent function. Bringing 
violators of humanitarian law to justice signals that both the country 
concerned and, increasingly, the international community, will not tolerate 
those who behave with complete impunity towards the basic minimum rights 
of others. It should act as a warning to others not to engage in similar future 
behaviour. 
Although the problem of enforcement in common Article 3 and Protocol 
II is important, it should nonetheless be kept in perspective. First, the 
establishment of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have 
established that violations of common Article 3 and Protocol II can still be 
prosecuted. Even had the Tribunal not been established, there is increasing 
evidence that breaches of common Article 3 and Protocol II are now 
considered as attracting criminal responsibility. The US and German Military 
Manuals, for example, both consider violations in internal conflicts as war 
crimes for which captured military personnel can be prosecuted. 3 2 
Second, the problem of prosecuting violations of humanitarian law is 
not confined only to internal conflicts. Despite more extensive enforcement 
mechanisms which pertain to international conflicts, the reality is that to date 
(apart from subsequent trials of former Nazi war criminals) there has been no 
application of war crimes law as it was established during the International 
Military Tribunals following World War II. This is despite no shortage of 
documented violations occurring in both international and non-international 
conflicts. In the prosecution of the two soldiers involved in the Mai Lai 
Massacre in V ie tnam 3 3 there was no reference to the international law 
elements of war crimes. In 1973, Bangladesh decided that it would prosecute 
195 Pakistanis for genocide, war crimes, and serious violations of the Geneva 
Conventions. However, due to political pressure it eventually transferred those 
32. MERON, T.: "International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities" (1995) 
89AmJIL 554, 565. 
33. Calley v United States (1973) 48 Court Martial Reports 19. 
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who had been accused back to Pakistan where no further action was taken 
apart from an apology by the government of Pakistan. 3 4 
Third, problems of enforcement in international law often encompass 
factors which are beyond the scope and power of legal instruments. 
Enforcement will often only occur where there is the political will by 
governments to do so. In the Bangladesh case mentioned above, factors such 
as Bangladesh's desire for recognition through United Nations membership, 
economic considerations and the basic need to maintain neighbourly 
relationships were factors which conspired to place political considerations 
over legal obligations. In both the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the Gulf 
Conflict of 1990 there was considerable evidence of breaches of humanitarian 
law, such as the treatment of prisoners and the use of chemical weapons. 3 5 Yet 
in both cases, despite clear evidence of violations and subsequent 
condemnation by the Security Council and at Diplomatic Conferences, no 
further action was taken. Both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals 
have expressed frustration over the lack of cooperation and delay afforded to 
them by governments in arresting indicted violators. 
Fourth, care must be taken that an unduly narrow approach is not taken 
to the problem of enforcement. On the basis of parallels with domestic law, 
the traditional legal concept of enforcement is generally considered as a 
process which occurs following violation. It contains a system which 
measures the violation against a set standard and sets the punishment 
accordingly. To some extent, one problem with the Nuremberg trials is that 
they created an expectation that war crimes must be automatically dealt with 
within a trial context. 3 6 However, there are dangers in drawing too much of an 
analogy between the operation of international law and criminal law systems. 
Nations observe laws for a complex set of reasons not least because of political 
pressures and foreign policy considerations. The need for friendly relations, 
trade and financial considerations, international influence, reciprocity and the 
costs involved in non-observance are all major factors to ensure compliance 
rather than the threat of potential litigation. More can perhaps be gained by 
examining the processes and reasons why states observe international law and 
34. For a fuller account of the legal issues involved in the proposed 
Bangladesh trials see Paust & Blaustein, "War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due 
Process: The Bangladesh Experience" (1978) 11 Van J Tran'l L 1. 
35. See ROBERTS, A.: "The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation" in 
European Commission, Law in Humanitarian Crises (1995) Vol II . 
36. Ibid, at 30. 
GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS 
using these as a basis for encouraging compliance with humanitarian law, 
rather than resort to trials as the primary enforcement mechanism. 3 7 
Finally, while enforcement has an important role there is a danger that 
focusing exclusively or substantially on the concept of punishment of 
violators, detracts from the wider issue of implementation and observance. 
Enforcement is the ambulance at the bottom of the cliff; once it becomes a 
problem then by implication humanitarian law or at least specific provisions 
of it, have failed. Ultimately, enforcement, particularly during war, must be a 
voluntary process which is encouraged by appropriate systems of education 
and dissemination about humanitarian law, preferably before armed conflict 
has commenced. 
e. Prisoners of War 
Under both the Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War and Protocol I, there is extensive reference to the protection 
of combatants who fall into the power of an adverse party. According to 
Protocol I, Article 43 (1) this includes all persons who belong to "organised 
armed forces, groups and units". In effect, captured combatants are granted a 
privileged status which recognises that a person who has been armed by the 
state and carries out his duties accordingly does so justifiably even if that 
involves killing. Provided that a prisoner of war has not violated the laws of 
war, the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I prohibit punishment of those 
persons solely on the basis that they have engaged in hostilities. Furthermore, 
states which are party to the Conventions must enact domestic legislation to 
punish persons who violate these provisions, in other words, who contrary to 
the express provisions of the Conventions, mistreat prisoners of war. Under 
both Protocol II and common Article 3 these privileges do not cover captured 
combatants in a civil war. While some parties may apply prisoner of war laws 
in internal conflicts, as occurred in Algeria by the Algerian National 
Liberation Front (FLN), there is no obligation to do so. This issue is 
particularly problematic in internal conflicts because the result is that a failure 
to observe prisoner of war provisions often generates bitter and violent 
atrocities between the parties. Governments tend to be particularly reluctant to 
repeal what is the equivalent of treason laws and allow rebels or dissidents to 
3 7 . See further HENKXN: HOW Nations Behave (London:Pall Mall, 1968) 3 1 -
6 4 . 
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kill or destroy government property subject only to detention as prisoners of 
war. Ordinarily, offences committed by rebels such as attacking military 
installations or other security breaches may well constitute treason under 
domestic law, the penalty of which in some countries may even be death. 
Consequently, a spiral of violence tends to be maintained. Government forces 
may apply increasingly violent methods to suppress rebel groups and to 
capture them. Often capture results in harsh interrogation, torture and 
immediate execution due to inadequate facilities of internment and the fear of 
escape. This in turn gives rebel groups little incentive to observe and respect 
humanitarian law, particularly towards government personnel, because while 
they are likely to be subjected to gross violations of their rights they are aware 
that there is no superior law regulating the actions of the government. Due to 
an increased emphasis on evading capture because of the consequences, both 
sides might adopt methods of warfare which breach humanitarian law and 
involve civilians who become the innocent vict ims. 3 8 A similar problem had 
formerly arisen in relation to the status of UN peacekeeping personnel. The 
problem was highlighted in Somalia where a number of incidents occurred 
against UN peacekeepers who were carrying out humanitarian duties and were 
deliberately killed by unknown attackers. 3 9 On 9 December 1994, the General 
Assembly adopted the Convention on the Safety of United Nations 
P e r s o n n e l . 4 0 The Convention creates a regime to prosecute or extradite 
persons accused of attacking United Nations personnel who are not in a 
combative role, including those in internal conflicts. 
f. State Sovereignty 
Humanitarian law generally is a compromise between military necessity 
and concerns to curtail the detrimental effects of war on humankind as much as 
possible. But in internal conflicts humanitarian law operates under a double 
burden because it must also accommodate the extent to which its principles 
38. This is evident, for example, in Sri Lanka, where the Tamil Tigers often 
employ the use of suicide bombing missions to attack military installations and 
government property, resulting in may deaths amongst both military personnel 
and civilians. 
39. See for example DRYSDALE, J.: Whatever Happened To Somalia (London: 
Haan, 1994) at 180-188 for an account of the June 5 incident in which 24 
Pakistani soldiers were killed. 
40. G.A. Res. 49/59 (Dec. 9, 1994). 
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impinge on state sovereignty. As the legislative histories of both common 
Article 3 and Protocol II reveal, it is the concern with state sovereignty which 
acts as a major impediment to expanding the scope of the provisions. Both 
common Article 3 and Protocol II recognise and address this problem but in 
doing so also affirm the notion of state sovereignty. Common Article 3 does 
so with its proviso that application does not change the status of the parties, 
while Protocol II, Article 3, prohibits intervention or anything that would 
affect a state's sovereignty. The result is that a state's decision not to apply the 
Protocol can not be challenged by another state as this constitutes 
intervention. On the other hand, any application of humanitarian law in an 
internal conflict does in reality impose limitations on the sovereignty of the 
state involved. Despite the proviso of common Article 3, rebels in a conflict 
will be given certain responsibilities and obligations under international law 
instruments which are generally only within the domain of states. Also, where 
a government accepts the services of the ICRC, its actions become subject to 
scrutiny by an external body. Consequently, states are reluctant to accept both 
Protocol II and common Article 3 because of their fear of the legal effects that 
the Protocol could potentially confer on dissident forces. The other source of 
reluctance is that states will inevitably wish to maintain control over any 
dissident faction by municipal law rather than relinquishing control to 
international law. 
Protocol II is even more problematic because it assumes that the rebel 
party already has some degree of organised control. A certain paradox then 
exists where the state, who is a party to the Protocol, will be expected to 
enforce it over territory over which in fact it no longer has control. Where 
control by the rebel force is extensive, the state will generally also have lost 
legal jurisdiction by its courts in those areas. This poses the perceived threat 
that applying the Protocol implies recognition of the sovereignty of the other 
party over the area it controls. It is for these reasons that the government side 
has often not considered it to be advantageous to its own position to apply 
the provisions of humanitarian law. In El Salvador, for example, the 
government refused to apply Protocol II despite the fact that the situation met 
the threshold requirements in terms of the rebels' control over territory. 4 1 The 
government believed that applying the provisions would give the rebels 
international status and further it considered it was in a more superior position 
to suppress the rebellion without the constraints upon it of international law. 
4 1 . WHEELER, supra note 2 4 at 212 . 
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Revolutionary forces, however, will generally be more inclined to want to 
have either provision applied because of their improved status and because it 
removes their behaviour from the realm of the criminal under domestic 
jurisdiction to protection under international law. 
The issue of sovereignty in internal conflicts creates an inherent friction 
between the rights of individuals and the interests of the state. But recent 
developments suggest that sovereignty may no longer be such a sacrosanct 
concept, as it once was. The development of human rights law, increased 
United Nations concern with the internal affairs of states and the concept of 
humanitarian intervention, point to a gradual erosion in the importance of 
state sovereignty as a reason for refusing to apply humanitarian law. 
g. Confusion of Instruments and Provisions 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the number of instruments which 
effectively regulate the various categories of internal conflicts is confusing. 
Selection of the appropriate instrument requires a prior analysis which may 
not only be impractical and open to interpretation but also entails a level of 
research which is beyond the competence of both the parties involved and 
interested groups such as the ICRC. In addition, it involves sensitive 
political issues which may put the neutrality of those groups in question. The 
creation of too many categories with prescribed boundaries, may mean that 
some conflicts do not fit neatly into any appropriate classification. This is the 
problem with "internationalised conflicts". Here a complicated situation is 
created where some combatants in the same conflict will be expected to 
observe the entire Geneva Conventions and other only the law pertaining to 
non-international conflicts. Distinctions on the basis of category are also 
artificial. Protocol I for example raises the question as to why wars of 
liberation against oppressive regimes which discriminate on the basis of 
ethnic groups or religion (e.g. Sudan) are not internationalised in the same 
way as wars against racist or colonial regimes. Ultimately, a victim is a 
victim and should not be discriminated against on the basis of imposed legal 
distinctions. 
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Conclusion 
It is apparent that changes are occurring in international humanitarian 
law as it applies to non-international conflicts. Although seemingly slow and 
insignificant compared to the scale of human suffering which occurs, these 
changes are breathing new life into the field of humanitarian law. The creation 
of the ad hoc Tribunals for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia have been amongst 
the most important and influential factors to reflect and determine those 
changes. The findings of the Tribunal to date, which include the extension of 
protection to include the Hague Regulations, the role of customary law and 
the criminalization of atrocities, have expanded the scope of protection and 
enforcement possibilities in internal conflicts which until recently were not 
thought to have existed. These trends also exemplify an erosion of the 
distinction between international and non-international conflicts. The term 
"international humanitarian law" is evolving to mean just that: an emphasis 
on the universality of the law without distinction. The fundamental principle 
of the Geneva Conventions, which is the protection of the individual in times 
of armed conflict, is gradually asserting itself without acknowledging artificial 
legal distinctions as to the nature of those conflicts. 
Significantly, this change has not come from the creation of further 
treaties but from public pressure which has led to the more pragmatic step of 
the establishment of the Tribunals for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. The 
situation parallels the events following World War II where the International 
Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo also stemmed from public 
outrage and the demand for justice. These subsequently developed new norms 
as to what constituted war crimes and their prosecution and led to the further 
development of the Geneva Conventions as they exist today. Such change 
also raise the question whether there is a need to re-examine the development 
of a new body of written law which explicitly erases the distinction between 
international and non-international conflicts. Certainly, the recent Declaration 
of Minimum Humanitarian Standards goes some way in simplifying 
humanitarian law and making it applicable to a very wide range of 
s i tua t ions . 4 2 The reality, however, is that the world is still dominated and 
42. The Declaration was drawn up by a group of jurists in Turku, Norway, in 
1990. Further changes to the Declaration were made during a meeting at the 
Norwegian Institute of Human Rights in Oslo on September 29-30, 1994. The 
Declaration has subsequently been transmitted to the Commission on Human 
Rights by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
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Protection of Minorities. See Res. 1994/26 , noted in EIDE, ROSAS and MERON, 
"Combating Lawlessness in Gray Zone Conflicts Through Minimum Humanitarian 
Standards" (1995) 8 9 Am J Intn'l L. 
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divided by sovereign states and it is unlikely that many states will concede to 
a new instrument that gives insurgents the same status as armed forces of an 
enemy state. Even the Tribunals continue to acknowledge the distinction 
between the two, as shown by the fact that the Rwanda Tribunal has 
jurisdiction only over breaches of common Article 3 and Protocol II. 
Ultimately, a single body of law covering all types of conflict should be the 
aim but this is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. Emphasis should 
also be directed at improving the process of dissemination of humanitarian 
law. The need to disseminate information about humanitarian law to as wide 
a base of the population as possible is crucial to minimise the effects of armed 
conflicts. Finally, that the international community is increasingly 
confronting the problems of internal conflicts and assuming greater collective 
responsibility for enforcing humanitarian law is to be welcome. But at the 
same time, more international effort must be directed at examining and 
eliminating the problems of poverty, racial and ethnic discrimination and 
availability of weapons which created those wars in the first place. 

